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ABSTRACT. A dichotomous decision-making context in committees is con-
sidered where potential partisan members with predetermined votes can generate
inefficient decisions and buy neutral votes. The optimal voting rule minimizing
the expected costs of inefficient decisions for the case of a three-member com-
mittee is analyzed. It is shown that the optimal voting rule can be non-monotonic
with respect to side-transfers: in the symmetric case, majority voting is optimal
under either zero, mild or full side-transfer possibilities, whereas unanimity voting
may be optimal under an intermediate side-transfer possibility. The side-transfer
possibilities depend on the power of partisans (their ability or willingness to pay
for neutral votes) relative to the corruptibility of neutral members (personal cost
of deliberately casting a ‘wrong’ vote).
KEY WORDS: Committee, Partisan voting, Vote buying, Majority rule, Unanim-
ity rule
JEL CLASSIFICATION NUMBERS: D71, D72.
1. INTRODUCTION
The literature on organizational decision making in committees1
is broadly concerned with the selection of the ‘correct’ alternat-
ive among a limited number, often two, alternatives. This literature
commonly makes two important assumptions. First, the committee
members are all motivated by the same public motive of contributing
to a correct decision when they vote (that is, there are no ‘partisan’
members). Second, the committee members do not sell their votes
for cash, gifts, or other benefits. This paper investigates the impact
of relaxing these two assumptions on the optimal voting rule.
We aim to capture a variety of decision-making contexts in-
volving small size committees: a municipal committee evaluating
various development projects, middle managers in a firm deciding
on a contract to be awarded for the supply of key inputs, mid-level
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bureaucrats in developing countries implementing specific public
policies, etc. Common to these examples is the propensity among
the committee members to influence the outcomes of any selection
process by casting biased votes and even ‘buying’ votes from other
members.2
We consider a committee, consisting of three members, appoin-
ted by an organization (or principal) under imperfect information
about the type of each member. Members can be partisans of the
‘yes’ or ‘no’ decision, or be neutral and motivated by the desire to
cast a ‘correct’ vote to maximize the commonly known objective
of the principal. The principal’s objective depends on the ‘state’,
which the committee members observe but the principal cannot.
The principal determines the voting rule (2/3 majority or unanimity)
to minimize the expected costs of wrongful committee decisions,
where partisan members, if any, can influence the decision by buy-
ing out neutral members’ votes. The side-transfer possibilities, that
is, whether one or two partisans can buy one or two neutral votes, de-
pend on the power of partisan members (ability or willingness to pay
for neutral votes) and corruptibility of neutral members (reservation
price or personal cost of modifying their votes).
We allow for asymmetric selection bias, as reflected in the
common prior belief that ‘yes’ or ‘no’ is the correct decision, asym-
metric costs for the two types of decision errors, and asymmetric
probabilities of partisan voting in each direction. The symmetric
case,3 however, provides a clear ranking of two voting rules; we
show that the optimal voting rule can be non-monotonic with re-
spect to side-transfers: majority voting is optimal under either zero,
mild or full side-transfer possibilities, whereas unanimity voting
may be optimal under an intermediate side-transfer possibility. The
intuitions for the optimal voting rule in the symmetric case are as
follows.
Majority voting has a natural advantage over unanimity voting
when side-transfers are impossible because unanimity voting puts
too strong a bias in favor of rejection (under unanimity voting
a single partisan of ‘no’ triggers the decision ‘no’). When side-
transfers are mild — it takes two partisans of the same type to buy
a neutral vote — the case for majority voting is even stronger: com-
pared to the case of no side-transfers, the principal’s expected payoff
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under unanimity voting falls (whereas it remains unchanged under
majority voting) because two partisans of the ‘yes’ type can now al-
ter a neutral member’s (correct) negative vote. However, introducing
the intermediate possibility that one or two partisan members buy
only one neutral vote, we find that unanimity voting performs bet-
ter if the probability of nonpartisan voting exceeds the probability
of partisan voting. The quality of decision making under majority
voting falls sharply in this case because whenever the committee
consists of two neutral members who intend to vote the opposite dir-
ection of the third, partisan, member, the partisan buys one neutral
vote, secures the support of the majority and induces his preferred
decision. Finally, if a partisan is powerful enough to buy two neutral
votes, majority voting becomes, again, the optimal voting rule. In
this case of full side-transfer possibilities, the relative advantage
of majority voting stems from the correct decision it induces in
committees comprised of two partisans with opposing interests and
one neutral member (in such committees unanimity voting always
induces the decision ‘no’.) The partisan whose interest coincides
with the correct decision can induce the neutral member to keep
his ‘correct’ vote unchanged at a lower price; the opposite partisan
would also have to compensate the neutral member for modifying
his vote in the wrong direction.
Our result that majority voting is superior in most cases largely
corroborates the familiar wisdom in the political science literature
on jury decision making, that of Condorcet Jury Theorem (Con-
dorcet, 1785).4 Our setting differs in that it includes the additional
features of partisan voting and side-transfer possibilities. The pres-
ence of partisan members with strong interests in the voting outcome
will always decrease the quality of committee decisions and gen-
erate inefficiency. This is a particular manifestation of a general
organizational problem, termed ‘influence activities’ by Milgrom
and Roberts (1988). Given the potential presence of partisan mem-
bers, we show that whether the possibility of side-transfers within
the committee improves upon the efficiency of decisions depends
on the voting rule and expected type profile of the committee. The
same possibility of side-transfers generates the possibility that a
pivotal neutral member is offered benefits for keeping his (correct)
vote unchanged. An organization may therefore choose a voting rule
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that generates a wider scope for internal transfers of cash or other
benefits in committees.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section outlines
the model. In Section 3, the optimal voting rule is derived for the
benchmark case of zero side-transfer. In Section 4, different (non-
zero) side-transfer possibilities are considered and their implications
for the optimal voting rule assessed relative to zero side-transfer
scenario. Section 5 concludes. The Appendix contains the proofs
of propositions.
2. THE MODEL
A principal appoints a committee of three members to advise him
regarding a project’s suitability for the organization. Each mem-
ber separately and simultaneously votes x = 1 for acceptance, or
x = −1 for rejection. The principal’s main problem is to choose a
voting rule, V (·), that maps the number of votes favoring acceptance
into a final decision R, with R = 1 denoting acceptance of the pro-
ject and R = −1 denoting rejection of the project. The principal’s
desirable decision depends on a random variable ω, the state, which
the principal cannot observe. It is common knowledge that the value
of ω is 1 with probability α, −1 with probability 1−α. The desirable
decision in state ω is ω. We let B(R : ω) denote the principal’s
payoff from decision R in state ω. B(1 : 1) > B(−1 : 1) and
B(−1 : −1) > B(1 : −1). Define B(1) = B(1 : 1) − B(−1 : 1)
as the benefit of avoiding a type I error and B(−1) = B(−1 :
−1)− B(1 : −1) as the benefit of avoiding a type II error.
There are three potential types of committee members. Two of
these types are ‘partisans’. We define a partisan as a member who
has a predetermined vote regardless of his perception of the desir-
able decision from the principal’s viewpoint, and never alters his
vote in exchange for a payment;5 a partisan will ‘buy’ votes (that is,
offer cash, gift or any benefit), if worthwhile and possible, to induce
his preferred decision. A type-(1) partisan always votes x = 1,
and a type-(-1) partisan always votes x = −1. The third member
type, called type-(0), is ‘neutral’ in that he would vote for what he
perceives the desirable decision of the principal. Though type-(0)
members never buy votes, we allow them to be corruptible, that
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is, to vote according to the preference of a partisan member who
offers a sufficiently high side-transfer. A neutral member incurs a
disutility of c by modifying his vote for a side-transfer. The vari-
able c thus captures ‘corruptibility’ or ‘price’ of neutral members.
The maximum that a partisan would pay to have the final decision
altered according to his own preference by buying neutral vote(s)
is v, which we assume to be common for type-(1) and type-(-1).
The variable v captures the power of partisan members.6 Members’
types are independently drawn from a common distribution. Each
member is of type t ∈ {−1, 0, 1} with probability βt > 0, and
β−1 + β0 + β1 = 1.
Our model thus differs in style from standard jury decision mak-
ing models where the jurors (along with the organization/society
they represent) share the same costs/benefits of collective decisions.
Here, the committee members are appointed to observe the true
state and vote according to the principal’s preferences and produce
the desirable decision, but potential presence of partisan members
and side-transfers for votes can generate inefficient outcomes. The
sequence of events is as follows:
• (Stage 0) Nature draws the state (hence, the desirable decision)
and the type configuration in the three-member committee.
• (Stage 1) The principal determines the voting rule, majority vot-
ing (V = M) or unanimity voting (V = U ). Under majority
voting, R = 1 only if the number of x = 1 votes is at least two.
Under unanimity voting all three votes must be x = 1 to have
the decision R = 1; otherwise R = −1.7
• (Stage 2) Committee members learn the entire type configur-
ation and observe the true state ω (hence, the environment is
one of complete information); there is no human fallibility. The
partisan members, if any, can individually or as a group offer
side-transfers to buy neutral members’ votes.
• (Stage 3) The committee members individually vote and a final
decision R is made according to the voting rule determined in
Stage 1.
The assumption that the members know the true state serves to
simplify the analysis, and should not be considered literally ap-
plicable. Furthermore, by abstracting from the problem of human
fallibility, it allows us to highlight the pure role of potential pres-
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ence of partisans and side-transfers in determining the principal’s
choice of the voting rule. The assumption that the committee mem-
bers learn each others’ types is not too restrictive given the purpose
of the analysis. If types are private knowledge, partisan members
would engage in lobbying and gathering information about the types
of other members, and they would identify the committee mem-
bers who would be willing to sell their votes. This should not be
a difficult task in especially small-size committees.
Below we compare the effectiveness of the two voting rules,
majority voting and unanimity voting, under different sets of as-
sumptions regarding the extent of potential side-transfers.
3. NO SIDE-TRANSFERS: THE CASE 2V ≤ C
We compare the two voting rules in this section under the assump-
tion that side-transfers are impossible, which corresponds to the case
2v ≤ c: even two partisans of the same type cannot buy a neutral
vote. Now the strategy of a type-(0) member is to vote according to
the observed state, x = ω. We shall write the principal’s expected
payoff under voting rule V = M,U as
WV =α[AV B(1 : 1)+BV B(−1 : 1)]
+ (1 − α)[CV B(1 : −1)+DVB(−1 : −1)], (1)
where AV and DV denote the probabilities that the committee
makes the right decision when the state is respectively ω = 1
and ω = −1, and BV and CV denote the probabilities that the
committee makes the wrong decision when the state is ω = 1
and ω = −1, respectively. AV , BV , CV and DV will be func-
tions of β−1, β0 and β1, and obviously of the voting rule. The two
voting rules will generate, by inducing different probabilities of ac-
curate/inaccurate decisions, different expected payoffs. Below we
summarize the optimal voting rule due to partisan voting only.
PROPOSITION 1. Assume v ≤ c/2 or that side-transfers are im-
possible. Then majority voting should be preferred (WM ≥ WU ) if
and only if
α(β1 + β0)2β−1B(1) ≥ (1 − α)β21 (β−1 + β0)B(−1). (2)
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The left-hand side of (2) corresponds to the net benefit (or the
cost that is avoided) under majority voting:8 When one member is
of type-(-1) while the other two members are either of type-(1) or
-(0) and the true state is ω = 1, the wrong decision R = −1 (which
is made under unanimity voting) is avoided under majority voting.
The right-hand side of (2) corresponds to the net benefit under unan-
imity voting: when the observed state is ω = −1 and there are two
members of type-(1), the presence of one type-(-1) or -(0) member
triggers the correct decision under unanimity voting, while majority
voting generates the wrong decision R = 1.
We obtain a clear-cut comparison in a special case of Proposition
1.
COROLLARY 1 (Symmetric case). If the two partisan types are
equally likely (β1 = β−1 < 1/2), there is no prior selection bias
(α = 1/2), and avoiding the two types of errors are equally benefi-
cial (B(1) = B(−1)), then majority voting performs strictly better
(WM > WU ).
The intuition for this result is that in the symmetric case unanimity
voting generates a bias too large in favor of rejection (R = −1).
The optimality of the majority rule in the symmetric case has also
been established by Ben-Yashar and Nitzan (1997), but in a different
setting, where all voters are assumed to be neutral, incorruptible
but fallible (as opposed to our partisan voters who observe the true
state but may deliberately recommend the wrong alternative).9 The
design of the selection rule in our Proposition 1 mainly addresses
the difficulties from partisan voting, whereas the objective of Ben-
Yashar and Nitzan is to minimize the costs of unintentional human
errors of judgement.
4. INTRODUCING SIDE-TRANSFERS
We now investigate how the possibility of side-transfers can change
the relative performance of the two voting rules. With three mem-
bers and three potential types for each member, the number of
possible type configurations is 27. Thus, even in this simple case
there is a large number of possible voting coalitions to ‘win’ a fa-
vorable decision. Depending on the committee’s type configuration,
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one or two partisan members can buy a neutral vote, or one partisan
member alone can buy two neutral votes. There are nine type config-
urations where side-transfer cannot occur. These involve all-partisan
committees and one in which all members are of type-(0). Below we
identify the type configurations in which side-transfers are possible,
to prepare for the analysis that follows.
Six type configurations involve members of three different types.
In these cases there will be no side-transfer under unanimity rule
because the presence of one type-(-1) member suffices to induce the
decisionR = −1. This is not so under majority rule. Two (opposite)
partisans will now compete for the neutral vote to have the decision
set according to their preference.
In other six type configurations two neutral members are com-
bined with a partisan member. The following cases may arise. If the
observed state is ω = 1 and the partisan is of type-(1), there will
be no side-transfer under either voting rule. If the partisan’s type
is changed to (-1), under majority voting the partisan has to buy at
least one neutral vote to induce R = −1, while under unanimity
voting R = −1 is guaranteed, hence, no need for buying votes. On
the other hand, if the observed state is ω = −1 and the partisan is of
type-(-1), side-transfer will not occur. If the partisan is of type-(1)
then he has to buy one vote under majority voting, two votes under
unanimity voting, to induce R = 1.
Finally, in six type configurations a neutral member is matched
with two partisans of the same type. Under majority voting the par-
tisans get their preferred decision anyway. Under unanimity voting,
the same is true if the partisans are of type-(-1). If the partisans are
of type-(1), however, they have to offer a transfer of size at least c
to win the neutral member’s vote when the state is ω = −1.
4.1. Mild side-transfers: c/2 < v ≤ c
We begin with the mild side-transfer possibility, c/2 < v ≤ c, where
it takes two partisans of the same type to buy a neutral vote.
As discussed in the final paragraph preceding this subsection,
side-transfer can occur only under unanimity voting, if and only
if either one of the type configurations (1, 1, 0), (1, 0, 1), (0, 1, 1)
obtains and ω = −1 is observed. We obtain the following result.
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PROPOSITION 2. Assume c/2 < v ≤ c, so that it takes two partis-
ans to buy a neutral vote. Introducing the possibility of side-transfer
lowers the principal’s expected payoff under unanimity voting, WU ,
by 3(1 − α)β21β0B(−1), while the expected payoff under majority
voting remains unchanged. Thus, WM ≥ WU if and only if
α(β1 + β0)2B(1) ≥ (1 − α)β21B(−1). (3)
If majority voting yields a higher expected payoff under no side-
transfer, it also does so under the mild side-transfer possibility
considered in Proposition 2. In particular,
COROLLARY 2 (Almost symmetric case). Majority voting rule is
optimal in the absence of prior selection bias and symmetric error
costs but for mostly arbitrary member types, that is, if α = 1/2,
B(1) = B(−1), βt > 0.
Note that the optimal voting rule may switch from unanimity
voting to majority voting as we move from no side-transfer to the
case of mild side-transfer. The intuition is as follows. In the no side-
transfer case, the advantage of unanimity voting principally lies in
preventing two type-(1) partisans from altering the decision when
ω = −1. But this also has a cost: with two neutral types and one
type-(-1) partisan and ω = 1, the wrong decision R = −1 will be
induced; if instead majority voting is applied, the correct decision
R = 1 will be induced because in the mild side-transfer case one
type-(-1) partisan will fail to buy two neutral votes. Thus, under
the mild side-transfer possibility, the principal’s approach is mostly
to discourage these transfers by opting for majority voting. How-
ever, as we will show in sections 4.2 and 4.3, there is no simple,
monotonic relationship between the optimal voting rule and the ex-
tent of potential side-transfers (Corollaries 2.1, 3.1 and 4.1), nor is
side-transfer necessarily an impediment to efficient decision making
(Lemma 1).
4.2. Intermediate level of side-transfers: c < v ≤ 2c
Increasing v above c brings in a much larger set of side-transfer
possibilities. Now, one or two partisan members can buy a neutral
vote though one partisan cannot buy two neutral votes. Below is
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the list of type configurations in which side-transfers may change
the committee decision under majority rule. Side-transfers will not
occur under unanimity rule for these type configurations.
• Two type-(0)s and one type-(1). Under majority voting the type-
(1) member will buy one neutral vote only if the observed state
is ω = −1.
• Two type-(0)s and one type-(-1). Under majority voting the type-
(-1) will buy one neutral vote only if the observed state is ω =
1.
• Three different types. Under majority voting, there will be com-
petition for type-(0)’s vote regardless of the observed state. As
we show in Lemma 1, the partisan whose type coincides with
the correct decision (observed state ω) wins the neutral mem-
ber’s vote, because the other partisan type has the disadvantage
of inflicting the cost c on the neutral member by modifying his
intended vote. That is, the partisan of type-(ω) can keep the
neutral member’s vote unchanged at a lower price.
LEMMA 1. Suppose three voters are respectively one each of three
different types, and v > c. Under majority voting, if ω = 1 (resp.
ω = −1) then type-(1) (resp. type-(-1)) member wins the vote buying
contest at an equilibrium bid price of v− c and the correct decision
R = 1 (resp. R = −1) is induced.
Proof. The bidding contest between the two partisans to buy
the neutral member’s vote is a complete information game, so we
analyze the corresponding Nash equilibrium.
The neutral member casts his vote in favor of the partisan whose
bid yields him the higher net utility. The tie is broken by the neutral
member casting his vote in favor of the partisan whose vote coin-
cides with the true state ω. As we will see below (footnote 10), the
tie-breaker is critical to ensure that a Nash equilibrium exists.
Consider the case ω = 1. The neutral member’s intention is to
vote x = 1, which combined with the vote x = 1 by the type-(1)
partisan, would result in R = 1. However, the partisan of type-(-
1) would offer a (maximum) bid of b−1 = v to buy the neutral
member’s vote and alter the final decision to R = −1. The net gain
to the neutral member is thus v − c > 0. In response to b−1 = v,
the partisan type-(1) would offer at least b1 = v− c to win back the
neutral member’s vote so that R = 1. It is easy to see that b1 > v−c
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cannot be an equilibrium, since the type-(1) partisan can win the
contest with a lower bid of b′1 = b1 −  > v − c. Nor is b1 <
v − c an equilibrium, since the partisan type-(-1) would then offer
b−1 > b1 + c + , for  small, which would be accepted by the
neutral member. Finally, any bid b−1 < v will always lose to b1 =
b−1 − c+  that drives the partisan of type-(-1)’s bid up to b−1 = v.
Thus, b−1 = v and b1 = v−c will constitute the unique equilibrium
and the correct decision R = 1 will be implemented.10
Similarly, when ω = −1, the type-(-1) partisan will win the
contest by bidding b−1 = v − c while the type-(1) partisan will
bid b1 = v, and the decision R = −1 will be implemented. 
Thus, when all three members are of different types, unan-
imity voting does not induce side-transfers but it is worse than
(from the principal’s point of view) majority voting which induces
side-transfers. Majority voting, by creating an opportunity of side-
transfer, generates the ‘right’ price to align private incentives with
the social (i.e., principal’s) objectives.
We now summarize the effect of introducing intermediate level
of side-transfers on the principal’s expected payoffs.
PROPOSITION 3. Assume c < v ≤ 2c so that one partisan
(or two) can buy one neutral vote. The change in the principal’s
expected payoffs due to the possibility of side-transfers is
WU = −3(1 − α)β21β0B(−1)
under unanimity voting (that is, same as in Proposition 2), and
WM = −3β20 [αβ−1B(1)+ (1 − α)β1B(−1)] (4)
under majority voting. Thus, WM ≥ WU if and only if
αβ−1(β1 + 2β0)B(1) ≥ (1 − α)(β20 + β−1β1)B(−1). (5)
The intuition behind Proposition 3 can be grasped by identifying
the committee type configurations generating different decisions un-
der the two voting rules: (i) a committee of two type-(0)s and one
type-(1) induces R = 1 under majority voting, the correct decision
R = ω under unanimity voting; (ii) a committee of two type-(1)s
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and one type-(-1) induces R = 1 under majority voting, R = −1
under unanimity voting; (iii) a committee of three different types
induces R = ω under majority voting (by Lemma 1), whileR = −1
is induced under unanimity voting. Majority voting has the potential
benefit B(1) of avoiding type I error in cases (ii) and (iii), with
probability 3αβ−1β1(β1 + 2β0), while unanimity voting has the po-
tential benefit B(−1) of avoiding type II error in cases (i) and (ii),
with probability 3(1 − α)β1(β1β−1 + β20 ). Combining the benefits
of majority voting on the left-hand side and of unanimity voting on
the right-hand side yields condition (5).
COROLLARY 3 (Symmetric case). If α = 1/2, B(1) = B(−1)
and β1 = β−1 (< 1/2), the condition in (5) reduces to β1 + β−1 ≥
β0 : Majority voting should be preferred if a committee member is
more likely to be a partisan than neutral. However, if β0 > β1+β−1
then the unanimity voting is optimal.
Notice that the above corollary contrasts with the more general
optimality of majority voting under mild side-transfers (Corollary
2.1). Introducing the possibility that one partisan buys a neutral vote
generates a sharp fall in the expected payoff under majority voting
and this may alter the optimal voting rule to unanimity voting: com-
pared with the case of mild side-transfers, now the committee will
generate the wrong decision whenever two partisans of type-(−ω)
are matched with a neutral member.
4.3. Full side-transfer possibilities: v > 2c
The last case presents the largest side-transfer possibilities: even
one partisan member can buy two neutral votes. The new possibility
of side-transfer arises when the committee consists of two type-(0)
members and one type-(1) member. Under majority voting the type-
(1) member does not need to buy votes when ω = 1 is observed,
while the case ω = −1 is considered in the previous subsection (it
then suffices to buy one neutral vote). Under unanimity voting, the
type-(1) member has to buy both neutral votes to induce the decision
R = 1 when the state is ω = −1.11
Thus, the only new element to be considered here is the possibil-
ity that a type-(1) member buys two neutral votes when the state is
ω = −1, under unanimity voting. This leads to the following result:
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PROPOSITION 4. Assume v > 2c so that one partisan can buy two
neutral votes. The possibility of side-transfer induces the change
WU = −3(1 − α)β1β0(β1 + β0)B(−1) (6)
in the principal’s expected payoff under unanimity voting, while the
change in WM is as given in Proposition 3. Thus, WM ≥ WU if and
only if
α(β1 + 2β0)B(1) ≥ (1 − α)β1B(−1). (7)
When a single partisan can buy the rest of the committee’s neutral
votes, the voting rules induce different decisions in the following
cases: (i) a committee of two type-(1) members and one type-(-1)
member will induce R = −1 under unanimity voting, and R =
1 under majority voting; (ii) a committee of three different types
will induce R = −1 under unanimity voting, and R = ω under
majority voting. Thus, majority voting has an advantage in case (ii),
while in case (i) either voting rule can induce an inaccurate decision
depending on the state. Thus, unless B(−1) is too large relative to
B(1) and/or α is too small, majority voting should be preferred over
unanimity voting. In particular:
COROLLARY 4 (Almost symmetric case). If α = 1/2 and B(1) =
B(−1), majority voting yields a higher expected payoff to the
principal for all member types.
Note that the optimal voting rule may switch from unanimity voting
back to majority voting as we move from intermediate to full side-
transfers.
5. CONCLUSION
With potential presence of partisan members who can vote, and buy
vote(s), for inefficient decisions, the optimal voting rule in the case
of dichotomous decision making committees becomes a function
of the extent of side-transfers, that is, partisan members’ power
relative to corruptibility of neutral members. We considered small
committees of size three. We have shown, in the symmetric case
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TABLE I
Optimal voting rule
Side-transfers Optimal rule Condition
Zero Majority rule β1 = β−1 < 1/2
Mild Majority rule βt > 0
Intermediate Either rule (*) β1 = β−1 < 1/2
Full Majority rule No restriction
(* See Corollary 3.1.)
(where approval and disapproval are equally likely to be the correct
decision, the costs of two potential types of errors are the same and a
partisan member is equally likely to be for or against the proposal),
that majority voting has a relative advantage over unanimity vot-
ing except possibly under an intermediate side-transfer possibility.
Table 1 summarizes the optimal voting rule in the symmetric case
where α = 1/2, B(1) = B(−1), as a function of side-transfer
possibilities.
Our restriction to three-member committees should not be con-
sidered too serious a restriction given many real-life decision con-
texts where important decisions are often delegated to small com-
mittees of size three. Deriving a compact formula for the optimal
voting rule in the general case of n committee members as a function
of the extent of potential side-transfers is much beyond the scope of
this paper. Such an objective seems to be intractable because of the
need to consider a large number of side-transfer possibilities and
compare a large number of alternative voting rules.12
6. APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 1. We derive below the expression of the
principal’s expected payoff under majority voting. The committee’s
decision will be R = 1 in the following cases:
• At least two members are type-(1) partisans. The probability of
such type configurations is β31 + 3β21β−1 + 3β21β0;
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• The members are all of different types and ω = 1 is observed
(thus the type-(0) member votes x = 1). The probability of this
type configuration is 6β1β−1β0;
• One type-(1) member and two type-(0) members, and ω = 1 is
observed. The probability of this type configuration is 3β1β20 ;
• One type-(-1) member and two type-(0) members, and ω = 1 is
observed. The probability of this type configuration is 3β−1β20 ;
• Three type-(0) members who observe ω = 1. The probability of
this type configuration is β30 .
The list of the cases in which the decision R = −1 is induced
can be derived similarly. The expected payoff under majority voting
is given by (1) where
AM = β31 + 3β21β−1 + 3β21β0 + 6β1β−1β0 + 3β1β20
+ 3β−1β20 + β30 ,
BM = β3−1 + 3β2−1β1 + 3β2−1β0,
CM = β31 + 3β21β−1 + 3β21β0,
DM = β3−1 + 3β2−1β1 + 3β2−1β0 + 6β1β−1β0 + 3β−1β20
+ 3β1β20 + β30 .
Under unanimity voting the decision will be R = −1 whenever
at least one type-(-1) member is present in the committee or there is
at least one type-(0) member and the state is ω = −1. Otherwise the
decision will be R = 1. The expressions for AU , BU , CU and DU
are as follows. When the state is ω = 1, R = 1 with probability
AU = β31 + 3β21β0 + 3β1β20 + β30 ,
and R = −1 with probability
BU =β3−1 + 3β2−1β1 + 3β2−1β0 + 6β1β−1β0 + 3β21β−1
+ 3β−1β20 .
When the state is ω = −1, R = 1 with probability
CU = β31 ,
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and R = −1 with probability
DU = β3−1 + 3β2−1β1 + 3β21β0 + 3β−1β20 + 6β1β−1β0
+ 3β1β20 + 3β2−1β0 + 3β−1β21 + β30 .
So, we have
AM −AU = 3β−1(β1 + β0)2
BM −BU = −3β−1(β1 + β0)2
CM − CU = 3β21(β−1 + β0),
and DM −DU = −3β21(β−1 + β0).
Using these in the principal’s expected payoff WV in Eq. (1), and
comparing WM with WU , establishes the result. 
Proof of Proposition 2. The only differences in the mild case
of side-transfers, compared to the benchmark scenario of no side-
transfer in Proposition 1, are in the probabilities CU and DU while
the probabilities AU and BU remain unchanged. The modified
probabilities are as follows:
CU = β31 + 3β21β0,
DU = β3−1 + 3β2−1β1 + 3β−1β20 + 6β1β−1β0 + 3β1β20
+3β2−1β0 + 3β−1β21 + β30 .
(Thus, 3β21β0 is shifted from DU to CU .) Using the modified prob-
abilities in the principal’s expected payoff WV in Eq. (1), and
comparing WM with WU , establishes the result. 
Proof of Proposition 3. The cases in which the committee’s
decision may change (relative to the no side-transfer scenario in
Proposition 1) as a result of side-transfers are listed in the text. No
change occurs in WU while WM will change due to the change in
R in two cases. In a committee with two type-(0) members and
one type-(1) member, when ω = −1 the decision R = −1 will
change into R = 1. Thus, 3(1 − α)β20β1 should be subtracted
from DM and added to CM . In a committee with two type-(0)
members and one type-(-1) member, when ω = 1, R = 1 will
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change intoR = −1. We must therefore subtract 3αβ20β−1 fromAM
and add it to BM . Performing this exercise and rearranging terms
yields the change in the expected payoff under majority voting:
WM = −3β20 [αβ−1B(1)+ (1 − α)β1B(−1)].
Thus, WM ≥ WU if and only if
− 3β20 [αβ−1B(1)+ (1 − α)β1B(−1)]
+ 3α(β1 + β0)2β−1B(1)
≥ −3(1 − α)β21β0B(−1)+ 3(1 − α)β21 (β−1 + β0)B(−1),
which, on simplification, yields (5).13 
Proof of Proposition 4. Moving from the case c < v ≤ 2c to
2c < v modifies the principal’s expected payoff only under major-
ity voting, when a type-(1) member is matched with two type-(0)
members and the state is ω = −1. The correct decision R = −1
will become R = 1 and the principal’s additional loss will be
3(1 − α)β1β20B(−1), which yields the total loss in (6).
The principal’s expected payoff under the two voting rules can
be compared by using the same procedure as in the proofs of
Propositions 2 and 3. We skip the details. It can be shown that
AM −AU = 3β−1β21 + 6β1β−1β0 = −(BM −BU),
CM − CU = 3β−1β21 = −(DM −DU).
Using these expressions in (1) yields the result in (7). 
NOTES
1. See Nitzan and Paroush (1982, 1984), Shapley and Grofman (1984), Nitzan
and Procaccia (1986), Sah and Stiglitz (1988), Gradstein and Nitzan (1988),
Gradstein, Nitzan and Paroush (1990), and more recently Ben-Yashar and
Nitzan (1997).
2. These contexts differ from traditional vote buying models of legislatures (see,
for example, Buchanan and Lee (1986), Weiss (1988), Kochin and Kochin
(1998), Tullock (1998)) — while bribery among legislative members may not
be uncommon in less developed countries, such practices are likely to be rare
in the developed world.
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3. The symmetric case may be considered more representative of a decision-
making context where the principal does not know, ex-ante, what proposal(s)
the committee will vote and therefore a priori a selection bias and/or asym-
metric costs of errors may not seem justifiable. Given its importance, a similar
symmetric case received an exclusive attention by Nitzan and Paroush (1982).
However, they did not consider partisan voting or side-transfers but instead
allowed the skills of the committee members in choosing the right alternative
to differ.
4. There are more than one interpretation given to Condorcet’s views but the
general theme centers around the efficiency of the majority decision rule (see,
for example, Young (1988) or McLean and Hewitt (1994)).
5. More precisely, a partisan has a very high personal cost of changing his vote,
thus cannot be ‘bribed’ to this effect.
6. If vote transfer is prohibited by law or internal regulations, then we consider
v as net of the expected penalty of vote buying, and c as inclusive of the
expected penalty of vote selling.
7. The unanimity voting stipulating all members vote x = −1 for a decision
R = −1 constitutes the symmetric opposite of the unanimity voting we
study below. The results for this opposite unanimity voting can be obtained
by interchanging the partisan type subscripts (1) and (-1) in the analysis.
8. The multiplicative factor, 3, has been cancelled out from both sides.
9. The efficiency of a (qualified) majority rule was previously established also
by Nitzan and Paroush (1982), but in a less general setting than the one in
Ben-Yashar and Nitzan (1997).
10. If the opposite tie-breaker is used so that, when indifferent, the neutral mem-
ber casts his vote in favor of the partisan whose vote differs from the true
state, then to win against b−1 = v the type-(1) partisan will have to bid
b1 > v − c. But then no such b1 can be sustained in equilibrium as it can
always be lowered while still exceeding v − c.
11. There is another possibility of side-transfer, in a committee of two type-(0)
members and one type-(-1) member. Under majority voting the type-(-1) has
to buy one neutral vote, only if the state is ω = 1. But this case is considered
in the previous subsection. The type-(-1) has no need to buy votes under
unanimity rule.
12. With n = 3, we have four potential side-transfer possibilities, including the
case in which side-transfer is impossible, and two voting rules (the 2/3 major-
ity rule and the unanimity rule). With n = 5 the number of potential cases of
side-transfers goes up to eight, and the number of potential voting rules goes
up to three (the 3/5 and 4/5 majority rules and the unanimity rule).
13. The expression on the left-hand side of the inequality, WM , is derived by
adding WM to the WM of Proposition 1; WU , the expression on the right-
hand side, is same as in Proposition 1.
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